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35 U.S.C. § 101: Current Subject Matter Eligibility
Law Interprets “Abstract Ideas” with Abstract
Definitions
BY KAYLAN GEIGER/ON APRIL 26, 2020
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Subject matter eligibility, defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, requires a claimed invention to fall within
“one of the four categories of invention . . . i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.”[1] While the general understanding has been that Congress has
intended the patent laws to be understood expansively,[2] the Supreme Court has explained
the inherent limitations on patentable subject matter.[3] These judicial exceptions include
abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.[4] By prohibiting the grant of patents
on judicial exceptions, the Court intended to prevent inhibiting “further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenuity.”[5] Thus,
taken together, the statutory language and the judicial exceptions require that the claims “be

directed to patent-eligible subject matter and not to a judicial exception (unless the claim as a
whole includes additional limitations amounting to significantly more than the exception).”[6]
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the principle that categorical rules for denying
patent protection for “inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate
the purposes of the patent law.”[7] Yet, in an attempt to avoid categorical rules, we are
precisely frustrating the principles the Supreme Court wanted to protect. Contemplation of
biotechnological and computer-implemented technologies that are currently being pursued
today were, arguably, not within the contemplation of Congress in 1952. While § 101 is a
“dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions,” these
unforeseen inventions cannot be precluded from patentability merely because of the lack of a
definitive definition as to what significantly more than the exception means.[8] Moreover,
analyzing the subject-matter of a patent on a claim-by-claim basis in the § 101 analysis is
inconsistent with the patentability analysis that occurs in, for example, §§ 102 or 103—where
the claims are construed in light of the application as a whole.
In recent years, the call for patentable subject matter clarification has snowballed. What
started with some general dissatisfaction with the cumulative principles articulated in the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice has now become proposals by
major players in the intellectual property field.[9] Since these decisions have issued, there have
been online blog posts,[10] calls for public comments,[11] PTO memoranda[12] and agency
guidelines,[13] proposed amendments to current laws,[14] legislative hearings,[15] economic
analyses,[16] and law review articles.[17] Moreover, since the Alice decision was rendered in
2014, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari for at least 46 petitions that centered on a §
101 issue.[18] At least four of these rejections were after both at least nine Federal Circuit
judges, and the Solicitor General requested clarification for
the Alice/Mayo framework.[19] Individuals in general and research groups, including groups at
the Federal Trade Commission have also expressed concerns about the lack of clarity and the
negative impact this uncertainty has on competition. For example, General Counsel, Alden F.
Abbott, has expressed the need for reform because of the perverse incentive provided by the
unclear application of patent law principles.[20] Specifically, Abbott emphasizes the lack of
incentive for investors and accompanying difficulty entering the market without some form of
funding that may result from the inability to know whether the research subject will fall within
something more than mere abstract ideas, natural phenomena, or natural laws.[21]
The effects of uncertainty in § 101 inhibits innovation, which in turn, runs counter to the
purpose of patent laws in general. For example, a startup or inventor wanting to bring their
innovative ideas to the market to share with the public, requires funding. In order to obtain
said funding, the first step is generally to obtain a patent,[22] for “intellectual property is often
the most valuable asset of a startup.”[23] Obtaining intellectual property rights provides
security, and patents grants a limited amount of time where recovery for infringement is
provided by law. Unlike trade secrets, which are dependent upon each party privy to the

information keeping it from everyone else, patents are granted the rights as soon as the
patent is issued.
While the USPTO patent eligibility guidelines and memoranda have provided some clarity, this
clarity is just a band-aid on the larger problem with the patent system.[24] The current clarity
and trust innovators have in the patent system is minimum. These efforts are not a band-aid—
the attempted clarification is about as useful as trying to fix a burst pipe with paper. Critics
likely will argue that these guidelines have provided enough clarity for USPTO Examiners, and
thus this should be sufficient for all others. However, the Updated Guidelines have resulted in
a mere 25% decrease in the likelihood that an Alice-affected technology will not receive a first
office action response with a § 101 rejection. However, a 25% reduction is unlikely to provide
the confidence and security an investor is seeking when they offer the substantial capital
required for some new, ground-breaking technology.[25] The United States, as a whole, once
viewed as the leader of innovation, is slowly falling behind. As the predictability in patent
protection diminishes, alternative forms of intellectual property protection become more
attractive. In the worst scenario, inventors are likely to seek patent protection from another
country that has more friendly patent laws.
Investors are without merit if they find this 25% decrease to be unconvincing—especially
considering applications by smaller entities, such as startups and individuals, had claims that
were rejected under the Alice analysis more often than similar subject matter claimed in
applications of larger entities.[26] The disproportionate number of rejections faced by small
entities is detrimental to innovation and prevents an efficient marketplace from
operating.[27] While some have argued that our ‘one size fits all’ patent system has brought
the United States to where we are now, a question prevails: where would we be if inventors
had sufficient clarity in the law and if investors had sufficient security on their investment?
As a solution to the current unpredictability, some have called for additional statutes to be
enacted. One commenter called for an additional patentability requirement be established—
the completeness requirement. There have also been arguments for an additional form of
patent as a remedy to unpredictability and lack of clarity. Ultimately, a minor amendment to
the current § 101 can provide the necessary remedy.[28] In the alternative, to serve the
purposes of promoting innovation, technology-specific patent terms that correlate to the
amount of time and money invested in the research may encourage investment in risky
R&D.[29] Greater patent protection is also required to “reduce the likelihood of patents stifling
future innovation.”[30] Economic forces make inventions with lengthy R&D times less profitable,
all else being equal, which discourages new competitors from entering into the market. These
perverse incentives inhibit intellectual property, which restricts the technological innovation of
the United States in the 21st Century. Something must change with the current patent laws for
them to be aligned to promote the individual to disclose their innovation to the public. If no
change were to occur, the United States is likely to see a growing number of individuals who
believe the current patent system is inadequate, unpredictable, and uneconomical.
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